【日米合同のトランスフォーメーション（軍の変革）】

Under Secretary Feith: Well the Japanese have a number of decisions of their
own to make about transformation. This is a time when the United States is
thinking through all kinds of aspects of transformation from the way we have
ourselves postured around the world to the kinds of equipment we purchase,
the way we structure our forces. The concept of transformation is
multifaceted. The Japanese are engaged in, I would say, a similarly
multifaceted effort looking at their own forces. It's useful, in fact, that
we're talking together about that, and I think the idea of promoting
what I like to call combined transformation, ways that we can work together
so that we can transform better through the discussions that we are having
together is a good thing. I am not going to comment on decisions that the
Japanese are contemplating about how they do their own transformation, but
on your question about Okinawa, as you know this is a major focus of our
talks, and we have been engaged with the Japanese government for many years
on how to make changes in Okinawa that allow us to do the missions that
needs to be done and take due consideration of the concerns
of the Okinawans. I think we will succeed. We have already succeeded to some
extent. There has been the process that's been underway for years under
which a number of changes have already been made, and we're talking about
additional changes, and I think that at the end of the day, we will succeed
in getting rid of irritations that are unnecessary or that have grown up or
become aggravated over recent years. One of the things that we have found,
and it's not just in Japan, we have found that all over the world is, we
made arrangements many years ago that were based on the lay of the land at a
given moment in time, and then, over the decades, the cities grow, areas
that used to be remote turn out to be in the middle of urban areas now, and
we have not made the kind of comprehensive review of our position around the
world that we are doing now. I think what we are doing now in our global
defense posture realignment is not only as some people have described it,
and maybe even I have described it before, as the biggest thing of its type
since WWII. I think I have been corrected that it is unprecedented. In other
words, not even before WWII did we ever look at our posture this way, and
one of the things that it allows us to do is to take account of the fact
that the lay of the land has changed, not just in Okinawa but in Korea, in
Europe, all over the world, and this gives us an opportunity to update our
posture and improve it and thereby improve the relationships that we have
with our host countries.

　今は、米国があらゆる側面からトランスフォーメーションを考えている時だ。
世界中でどのような態勢をとるかから、調達する装備の種類や軍の構成の仕方にまで至るあらゆる側面だ。
トランスフォーメーションという概念は多面的だ。
日本も同様に、彼ら自身の軍（のトランスフォーメーション）について考える、多面的な努力をしている。
実際、そのことについてわれわれがともに話し合うことは有益だ。
われわれが進めている議論を通してよりよく変革を遂げられるようにするため
――私は「コンバインド・トランスフォーメーション」（合同の変革）と呼びたいが――
ともに行動できる方法を発展させるという考えはいいことだ。

Mr. Kato (Asahi Shimbun): Are there sticking points between Japan and the
United States right now since the transfer of I Corps, the first Corps, from
the state of Washington, it seems to me that it is not clear yet, what it is
that
the United States exactly wants to relocate from the state of Washington to
Camp Zama. Of course I understand that I Corps itself is going to be
transformed through the course of this entire comprehensive transformation,
so first could you tell me what exactly you want to bring over to Zama, and
why because the Japanese government has to give a good
reason why Japan has to step up its host nation support and the way to
cooperate with the United States. What exactly do you want to bring over and
what is the reason that you can explain to the Japanese government that we
should accept your proposal?

　【在日米軍再編の狙い】

Under Secretary Feith: Well, I don't want to get into more, into a level of
detail that is not appropriate. Permit me to address your question at a
somewhat higher level of generality. What we are working on with the posture
realignment in general, and specifically in Japan, we're working to increase
our ability to work with other countries, with our partners, with our
allies, in defense missions across the range of relevant operations, all of
the way from combat to peace operations. We have a lot of things that we
want to do in the world that require good cooperation with lots of other
countries, and so what we are aiming at with the posture realignment is to
put ourselves in a position where we can work more effectively with more
countries. Now the goal is to, as we work with countries like Japan, to make
sure that we are addressing not only the broader global security issues, but
issues of direct relevance to this region, and I think that when we finish
this posture realignment we are going to have increased deterrence in this
area.
We are going to have increased capability to work with Japan on security
concerns that directly relate to Japan and security concerns that are around
the world that we have in common with Japan. Now, what we are interested in
is
having the kinds of facilities and the kinds of activities that will improve
our ability to work together, and that applies to air forces, maritime
forces, ground forces and making sure that we have the right kinds of
connections and the right kinds of relationships and can work on developing
doctrine together, and can train together, and do combined operations.
That's the goal, and that's the kind of consideration that we have in mind
when we talk about moving units around. It is all to serve the broader
purpose of making sure we have the right kinds of connections that we can
actually work together effectively, all types of forces.

　われわれは、戦闘から平時までのあらゆる作戦にわたる軍事任務で、他の国々、友好国、同盟国とともに行動できる能力を強化するよう取り組んでいる。
…態勢再編で狙っているのは、より多くの国々といっそう効果的に行動できる位置にわれわれ自身を置くことだ。
その目標は、日本のような国々と行動する中で、より広範な地球的規模での安全保障問題のみならず、この（アジア太平洋）地域に直接関連する問題に確実に取り組めるようにすることだ。
この態勢再編が終われば、この地域により高い抑止力を持つことになる。
われわれはより強化された能力を有し、日本に直接関係する安全保障上の懸念と、われわれが日本と共通して持っている世界中の安全保障上の懸念に対して、日本とともに行動することになる。
今、われわれが関心を持っているのは、ともに行動できる能力を高めるとともに、航空部隊、海上部隊、陸上部隊が利用できる施設と活動を確保することだ。
さらに確実に、正しい関係を持って、ともに戦術を発展させ、ともに訓練し、合同作戦を行えるようにすることだ。それが目標であり、われわれが部隊の移動について語る時にはそのように考えている。
すべてはより大きな目的のため、つまり、われわれがふさわしい関係を持って、実際にあらゆるタイプの部隊がともに効果的に行動できるようにするためだ。

Mr. Takahata (Mainichi Shimbun): If I may follow up to my colleague
Kato-san's question. If you can't go into details, but could you explain to
me the two transformation problems: one in South Korea, and one in Japan.
How do
they correlate, in terms of when do we flexibly deal with future cases of
instabilities in so-called instability area? One would think that the
Japanese public's worrying that to what extent and how much Japanese will
cooperate militarily into these situations, if they think that it is out of
a traditional boundary of Japanese security treaty, that comes back to
how do you translate the Article 6 of the treaty?

Under Secretary Feith: What we are focused on in the posture realignment is
creating capability. 　

われわれが態勢再編で焦点を当てているのは、能力の創造だ。
私が述べたように、同盟国や友好国とともに行動できる能力である。

As I said the capability to work together with allies and partners. Having
that capability doesn't mean that we have necessarily agreed in advance to
do any particular mission. Our partners in the world are sovereign countries
and they decide as sovereign decisions what they want to do. So the answer
to your question about what kinds of things might Japan and the United
States do in the future is going to depend on the sovereign decisions of the
United States and Japan, and what we are aiming to do with this realignment
is to simply give ourselves a better capability to work together when we
choose as a sovereign matter to work together. On the issue of Korea, I
think the principles that we are bringing to the work that we are doing in
Korea on realigning our posture there are essentially the same as the
principles we are bringing to the work that we're doing here in Japan, and

we are aiming at increasing our capabilities, making sure that they are up
to date, that we have the right high-technology equipment, that we have the
right disposition of forces, and
the example that I gave about urban areas growing certainly applies in
Korea. The Yongsan facility was built in what was considered a remote area
at the time that it was built, and it's now in the middle of Seoul, and it's
been an irritant in the relationship, and in the realignment that we are
doing there we are going to be relocating that facility, and that's the kind
of thing that makes sense to do, and it's the kind of updating that one
needs to do every once in a while, and one could argue that it's overdue,
but we are happy that we are addressing it, and at the end of the day we are
going to be better situated from a military point of view, better situated
from the point of view of our relationship with South Korea. We think that
our deterrent and defensive position will be improved, and we will put
ourselves in the position
where the alliances that we have with Korea and Japan are going to be more
capable and more usable for common purposes, and therefore more sustainable
for the future. One of the things that motivated this whole activity of the
defense posture realignment was our concern that if we don't update our
posture, we are going to be faced with a situation where these alliances are
... they're just not relevant. They don't have the right kinds of
capabilities for the future, and that would lead to an undermining in time
of popular support for the alliances, and we don't want that support
undermined. We want that support sustained and, if anything, increased. We
all understand that any time one makes changes, there's a certain unease and
a certain disturbance involved in making changes, but it's a necessary
price, in our view, to pay in order to have alliances continue to be
supported going into the coming decades.

Mr. Boyle: Let's come over hear and have another question.

Ms. Sieg (Reuters): To follow up, two questions. One is, in terms of the
Japan-U.S. alliance, security alliance, do you have any, I know it's often
said, perhaps too easily, that the U.S. would like Japan to be the Britain
of Asia.
Would you comment on that? And secondly, in terms of, recently it's been
said don't focus on the specifics of, you know, moving First Corps to Zama,
etc. etc., but on the principles that are involved so, in terms of
principles do you see a need to redefine or restate in any new sense the
basic U.S.-Japan security alliance. I think that's what particularly the
Japanese public is interested in: redefining, or is it necessary to redefine
that security alliance?

　【日米安保の再定義】

Under Secretary Feith: I think the world is different now from what it was
50 or 60 years ago, and all of our relationships inevitably get updated, get
adjusted, and to some extent redefined by new circumstances, and the kind of
relationships that we have with Japan, with NATO, with other allies in the
world are continually taking into account important new circumstances like
the 9-11 attack, like the War on Terrorism, like, compare that to the end of
the Cold War. The way I look at it, and I think what the term transformation
really means is, transformation is a frame of mind.

　（日米間で）共通の考えをより正式な形で定義するという考え方をわれわれは受け入れる用意がある。

It's a frame of mind that is continually processing the fact that the world
is changing, and so when you say, "Does the U.S.-Japanese security alliance
get redefined?" I would say it gets redefined continually, and it has been
redefined

continually over the last many years, and I think that's the right thing.
We're doing things together now that reflect the way the world is now. And
one of the things that changed in the world is the idea that there is such a
thing as regional security that is somehow detached from the security of
other regions in the world, and that idea just doesn't really fly anymore.
The world is so inner-connected, and this is part of the phenomenon of
globalization. All kinds of regions of the world are so much more intimately
connected with other regions of the world than they used to be because of
communications, ease of travel, technology and the like, and so you have a
much greater understanding on the part of many countries in the world that
things that happen in areas that used to be considered far away are really
of immediate security concern, and I think the willingness of countries to
do things ... NATO is a good example. There was a gigantic debate about
out-of-area operations by NATO, but after 9-11 you saw NATO jump into a role
in Afghanistan because of the recognition that what people do in Afghanistan
can tie into attacks on the United States that wind up affecting the whole
world economy.

Ms. Sieg (Reuters): Can I just interject? I think part of the concern in
some sectors in Japan is that this redefinition which you're talking about which is ongoing and certainly has become more obvious in the past several years is being
done without actually sort of officially admitting it or officially
redefining it. So what I'm saying is instead of just practically redefining it ... in other words there's been discussion about perhaps a new era, a statement, of updating the
Guidelines, or in some sense reinterpreting the actual security treaty, or
is it just going to go along, as you say, continually being redefined in a practical sense, without coming up with words that admit that or that recognize that?

Under Secretary Feith: I don't know the answer yet. There may be a decision
that we want to do something more formal to address aspects. That's
something in contemplation, but I'm not sure ... there's an argument that it
may be a good thing and there's an argument that it may not be necessary. I
think the treaty we have is a good treaty and provides a reasonable degree
of flexibility the way well written treaties tend to do. But it is true that
the world has changed pretty radically in recent decades, and the idea that
one might want to do the kind of more formal approach to defining common
ideas is something that we're open to.

Mr. Sugita (Kyodo News): You mentioned earlier about the doctrine which is
the combined activities of U.S. and Japanese forces, but the doctrine you
have in mind, what's the difference that doctrine has from the past
agreement between the U.S. and Japan legally? I mean, the doctrine is being formed
into some kind of paper, or some kind of treaty or something ... what do you
have in your mind when you say, "the doctrine?"

Under Secretary Feith: I don't remember, oh, when I said we could develop
doctrine, no no no, what I was referring to is military doctrine: how one
deals with certain types of military problems. I wasn't talking about
doctrine, strategic level doctrine, I was talking about the kind of doctrine that
military officers can work on to say that when we have this kind of a
problem this is our approach to it.

(…)

Under Secretary Feith: The issue of internal Japanese decisions on the
defense budget, I'm not going to comment on, but the point that I made about
the connection of events in certain parts of the world to other parts of the
world is, I think, relevant to the calculations that officials make in
countries all over the world about what is reasonable to invest in defense.
The prosperity of countries like Japan, the United States, and many of our
key friends who are part of the - how should we put it - the community of
the advanced economies, the prosperity of those countries depends on a
degree of stability, peace, orderliness, in international affairs, and there
are various types of problems, from aggression by nation states to
breakdowns in order in some countries, terrorism, and there are all kinds of
problems in the world that can have very serious, bad effects on
international stability, and have direct consequences for the economies and
for the quality of life of people in countries like Japan and the United
States. The quality of life of our people hinges on the ability of our
businessmen to travel and do business abroad, of our students to go study
abroad, of our tourists to go visit abroad. It's a matter of quality of life
for our people, and if international security is undermined by major
problems like terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
major wars and the like, even though those things may occur in what seems
like a remote part of the globe, it can actually affect our prosperity and
the quality of life of our people, and there's an understanding of that, and
that's why countries prudently invest in the kinds of defense capabilities
that allow them to contribute to international peace and security, and each
country's going to make its sovereign decisions on how it does that, but I
think that the reason that you see people in various parts of the world
making these difficult decisions to spend substantial sums of money for
defense is that there really is a recognition that the countries that do
that have an important interest in having those capabilities and being able
to deal with the kinds of
problems that you can deal with when you're capable like that. Otherwise,
you run the risk of becoming a victim of circumstances. Countries want to be
able to control their situation in the world, which is why they invest in
the capabilities to make the world a little safer, and more secure.

Mr. Brooke (New York Times): Jim Brooke again. Just two quick questions. In
light of what you just said ...Japan over the weekend, the last few days,
have been quite excited about this Japanese submarine that went into some
of the Ryukyus -
(…)

Under Secretary Feith: On the sub, it's a matter that has produced a
protest, as I understand, from the Japanese government to the Chinese, and
it's their matter to deal with. We, of course, support Japan's right to
protect its own territory. On Guam, I would say that the importance of Guam ties in to the point that I made earlier that the Asia-Pacific region is a region in which
U.S. interests are high and growing. We think this is an extremely important
Area economically, from a security point of view, and we are interested in having
capabilities in this area that will allow us to contribute and continue to
contribute to security, and uphold our alliances and commitments, and do
what we need to do, and Guam is a part of that. It's an important forward
presence for the United States in this region, and it's a place that has
contributed to our capability, and has the potential to contribute even
more.

Mr. Kato (Asahi Shimbun): Sir, you talked about removing the irritation a
couple times in your segment, and so I'm not going into detail, because you're not going to answer, I guess, but how do you set the measure of success in terms of removing the irritation, and if you listen to the people living around Futenma Marine Corps Air Station, for example, they want as much as possible, and they will never say, "Oh, that's
good enough." How far are you ready to go, and where do you set the goal of removing the irritation so that the alliance can be sustainable?

Under Secretary Feith: I think your question sets up the right
considerations, and exactly how you strike the balance is not easy to answer
in a word. I guess the short answer is you have to be sensible or prudent.
You pointed out that you're dealing with people who have particular
interests, and they are also part of a country that broadly has interests in
our alliance, and so they benefit as Japanese from all the fruits of having
this important cooperation with the United States. The Americans benefit; the Japanese benefit. But people who are directly affected obviously have very strong views about how they want things organized, and as you point out, you can't make everybody happy completely, and so you have to do these things as reasonably as you can. We
are attuned to the importance of organizing things in Japan in general and
Okinawa in particular, to make sure that we're not needlessly, excessively,
creating problems, while we're performing the crucial missions that are what
the alliance is about, and we're working with the Japanese government, we're
working with the local officials, to try to come up with ways to strike these
balances intelligently, where we can get our missions done, and serve the
broader purposes, and take care of the local considerations as best we can.

Mr. Takahata (Mainichi Shimbun): Mr. Secretary, I would like to revisit the
issue of transformation in South Korea, because the current discussions between you and allies are done like the hub and spokes kind of situations, and
there has been no discussions or talks between Japanese authorities and
South Korean authorities, and this may be a matter of a little bit further into the future, but as I understand from your remarks that the bulk of transformations
would give more ability for relating to deal with a little bit bigger area,
than probably at some point in the future there should be discussions of those three nations ? U.S., Japan and South Korea ? because as I read some of the media
reports in South Korea, partly because of the historical reasons, there are
certain politic nationalism on the part of the South Koreans, I am thinking that if they are to lose the headquarters regarding South Korea, and the headquarters
would be put into Japan, then the hurt, kind of, a little animosity toward
Japan, because their status would go down, and the Japanese status would be a little up, so I think it's a minor point from the U.S. point of view, but still, we are
to jointly together to deal with the new problems and the old problems in
the wider Pacific area. I think we need to address those issues between Japan and South Korea, together with the good chairmanship of yours. How do you
think that?

Under Secretary Feith: We clearly have regional security considerations that
require us to talk amongst ourselves. Imean the Japanese, the Koreans, the
United States, and we have various ways that we do that, not the least being
The six-party talks, where all three of us are participating.

Mr. Takahata (Mainichi Shimbun): And perhaps you are doing quite well, I
suppose, in terms of military planning.

Under Secretary Feith: There are regional security considerations that
involve the three of us, and others for that matter, and it's important that
we can work together. I must say I don't, and I don't think anybody in the
U.S. government, views this situation the way you were describing, that there's
somehow a tradeoff between the importance of Korea, or the importance of
Japan ... we don't view the posture realignment that we're doing with Japan
or Korea in those terms. It's not a matter of shifting from one place to
another. We want our posture in Korea to meet the principles that I talked
about, to give us the ability to do the security work that we need to do on
the Korean peninsula, to do the security work that we need to do more
broadly, to set us up so that we've got the right defensive positions, the
right deterrent, the right capabilities, and we want the same thing in
Japan, and we're going to make the changes in cooperation with the Koreans,
in cooperation with the Japanese, that make sense. That particular linkage
that you suggested is not one that registers with us.

Mr. Takahata (Mainichi Shimbun): I understand, but what I told you is
recently floated in some of the Korean media, the Korean newspapers. I can't correctly quote without the papers, but to sum up, they might feel that they're
being neglected through the transformation balance. So my question is
probably you need to address those things.

Under Secretary Feith: I would argue that the failure to transform is
neglect. They are not being neglected. We're going to be transforming in
Korea precisely because we don't want to neglect them.